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1. Introduction: Institutional design as a governing strategy 
 
Although not many politicians would use the name, institutional design is one of the 
prominent governing strategies used by politicians and administrators to achieve 
better outcomes, prevent undesirable outcomes or change outcomes of public policy. 
In fact politicians are constantly busy with changing and adjusting structures of 
institutional arrangements when their outcomes are not to their liking. 
Examples can be given easily. One could think of the prominent trend to create 
autonomous governmental organisations in almost all western countries (Pollitt et all, 
2001) which actually affect the decision making space of these organisations and 
changes their relations with their parent departments. Thus the authority rules and 
rules for interactions in the networks in which they function are changed. But also 
initiatives as Private Finance Initiative or the many partnerships arrangements in UK 
(or at many other countries (Osborne, 2000), or the many attempts in various western 
countries to enhance the participation of citizens and societal groups in decision-
making (McLaverty, 2002) can be seen as examples of institutional design. And these 
are only a few examples. One can easily find other attempts to achieve fundamental 
changes in the functioning of networks like the stress on market co-ordination and 
privatisation. 
 
What is institutional design? 
As the word already indicates institutional design is aimed at changing institutional 
characteristics of networks. Institutional design can roughly be described as 
interventions that try to change institutional structure, that is the set of rules, of policy 
networks. So they are not directly aimed at the process of interactions or concrete 
outputs but at the set of rules which regulate these interactions and the achievement of 
outcomes. As such institutional design is an indirect way of governance although 
certainly not an unimportant one. If we look at reform attempts of national 
governments we frequently see several interventions, which follow each other and 
which sometimes even conflict with each other.  In recent years we have witnessed in 
the Netherlands a couple of changes in the central organisation responsible for social 
security that followed each other in high frequency. First the central organisations 
were taken out of the hand of social partners (employee and employers organisations) 
then they were organised as agencies, then they were stimulated to work more in a 
market like environment and recently they are being taken back into the central 
bureaucracy and dismantled again. All these interventions within the period of 5 
years!  Al these interventions had important consequences for the relations between 
actors in the network of social security provisions, for the interactions between actors 
in the network and for the outcomes of the social policy network. 
 
Why institutional design? 
The ‘quest for institutional design’ certainly has to do with the idea politicians and 
administrators have that the outcomes of public policy and the way chains of actors 
deal with societal problems are not satisfactory. But it is also related to the growing 
importance of wicked problems and dealing with wicked problems. The partnerships 
in the UK are being designed because inner city problems of regeneration need 
combined efforts of actors and different sectors (Sullivan/Skelcher, 2002). Solving 
these wicked problems often does not fit in the existing institutional structures and the 
changing interventions are probably a sign that it is not easy to find the ‘right 
institutional arrangement’ if there is one. The problem we have at hand in this paper, 
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the North Sea fishery, is a very good example of a wicked problem (Koppenjan/Klijn, 
2004). There is no consensus about the nature of the problem (is there a problem with 
the available fish stocks and if yes what is the problem) about the information (about 
for example fish mortality) about possible solutions (closed areas, technical 
measures). It is also a problem that involves not only a wide variety of actors in 
different countries but also different networks (national fishery networks, 
environmental networks, international networks). So this is truly a wicked problem 
and one which seems difficult to solve trough the traditional national fishery 
networks. At least the EU tries actively to intervene in these networks, as we will see 
further on in this paper. 
 
The content of this paper 
There are thus important reasons to look at the phenomenon of institutional design 
more closely both theoretically and empirically. We do that in this paper by first 
exploring the phenomenon theoretically. We build on network theory to work out a 
conceptual scheme with which we can analyse interventions in the institutional 
characteristics of networks. With this conceptual scheme we analyse the institutional 
design interventions of the European Union in the national fishery networks. In this 
case we trace the influence of these interventions on the Dutch fishery network 
between 1990 and 2000. For that we make a detailed analysis of the changes in rules 
within the network and try to assess the impact that the EU interventions have on that 
change. So the rules and changes in rules are being treated as the dependent variable 
and the changes in strategies of the actors (partly) in reaction on the interventions of 
the EU which affect these the independent variable. 
Section 2 contains as mentioned the conceptual framework that has been developed. 
In section 3 we discuss the Dutch fisheries network and its relation to the European 
Union. We then sketch the most important rules in the 1990-2000 period (section 4). 
In section 5 the EU interventions and the developments in the Dutch fishery network 
are outlined. Then we analyse the results of the process of institutional redesign 
(section 6). Finally, we address the consequences and impact of the EU intervention 
especially for the typically Dutch construction of the Product Corporation (section 7). 
 
 
2. Institutional design in networks: an analytical perspective 
 
Institutions structure the behaviour of actors. They set conditions for interactions 
shape perceptions of actors, limit their strategic actions and construct their evaluation 
and appreciation mechanism. Looking at institutional characteristics of networks is 
essentially looking at a supra-individual explanation for the behaviour of actors 
(Scott, 1995). Not that actors or their actions do not matter but actors act within 
bounds formed by institutions. Institutions are ordering principles in a complex 
reality. In this sense, institutional theories differ markedly from more rational theories 
of decision-making (see March and Olsen, 1989). In rational decision making theories 
(such as public choice, economic game theories, and neo-institutional theories), the 
outcomes of decision making are analysed as the result of a conflict between the 
rational (e.g., utility maximising) behaviour of individual actors (March and Olsen 
refer to this as the ‘logic of consequences’ which they contrast with a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ in which actors try to fit and justify their actions in existing 
institutional rules; see March and Olsen, 1989). So if we want to say something about 
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institutional design we have to say first something about institutions and how they are 
formed and changed. 
 
Institutions as rules: formation and change 
Institutions and institutional arrangements are often regarded as sets of formal and 
informal rules (see Ostrom 1986, March and Olsen 1989, Klijn 1996, 2001, Scharpf 
1997, Steunenberg 2001). Scharpf (1997:38) defines institutions as “systems of rules 
that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose”. . The foundation 
of all forms of institutionalism is that “rules and systems of rules in any historically 
given society not only organize and regulate social behavior but make it 
understandable - and in a limited conditional sense - predictable for those sharing in 
rule knowledge.” (Burns, Baumgartner and Deville, 1985:256; in Scharpf, 1997:40).  
Institutions are thus sets of rules and in this sense networks must be considered as 
institutions. Each network does not only has its own history in which it is being 
shaped and changed but also can be distinguished from other networks by its unique 
set of rules. 
Within networks actors interact in a related series of interactions that we can define as 
games. In these games actors and rules from the network (but sometimes more than 
one network) are ‘activated’ around a concrete issue (for an elaboration, see: Van 
Bueren, Klijn, Koppenjan, 2003). But these rules are also applied, re-interpreted and, 
in the longer run, changed.  
Although there are of course situations where rules are consciously formed in games, 
which have been devised for that purpose, (think of establishing laws e.g.) rules are 
usually formed as a by-product during interactions. In other words, rules may be the 
product of conscious design behaviour by an actor – usually a public actor - but even 
then they are only rules if the other actors in the network recognise them as such and 
keep to them. Rules that are broken by the actors, either consciously or unconsciously, 
or are not (or no longer) complied with, lose their validity (Duintjer, 1977; 
Burns/Flam, 1997). This also clarifies under which conditions rules may change 
(Klijn/Koppenjan, 2004). 
- As a result of a conscious action (design/intervention) by an actor provided 
that this intervention is perceived to be legitimate by other actors in the 
network and is at least complied with (note that this is not necessarily in a 
literal sense. We will return to this later); 
- As a result of reinterpretation by actors; if a number of actors start to 
interpret existing rules in a different way (in terms of a judge who tries to 
apply abstract rules to concrete offences we could say: create a different 
jurisprudence) rules will change; 
- As a result of non-compliance or even conscious breaking of rules; if 
actors no longer comply with rules or even consciously break them and 
this stance is adopted by other actors and not followed up by effective 
negative sanctions, rules will lose their meaning. This process will usually 
be accompanied by the simultaneous formation of new rules (see Van 
Buuren/Klijn, 2004). 
 
These conditions may occur because actors view outside developments as relevant 
and change their perceptions and strategies and as result of that make different 
interpretations of rules or try to develop new rules. But actors can also evaluate their 
behaviour and resulting outcomes as negative and change their strategies in such a 
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way that is has consequences for the rules in the sense that they lose their validity or 
are being changed. 
The conclusion is that the changes of rules can either be initiated or forced upon by  
one actor, in which we speak of institutional design or can be the result of a joint 
strategy pattern of actors within the network. Of course these two things can happen 
(and often do happen!) at the same time. 
 
Directions of institutional design: how rules change 
Various management strategies may be distinguished which are based on the 
changing of rules. These strategies may be classified into three categories 
(Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004): 
- Strategies aimed at the network composition; these are strategies, which focus 
on changing or influencing the composition of the network. Based on the 
premise that the composition of the network has an influence on the 
interactions occurring within it so that the resulting outcomes produce changes 
in the composition of the network and therefore different interaction patterns 
and outcomes. There are various ways in which the composition of the 
network may be changed. For example, strategies aimed at consolidating or 
changing actors’ positions or adding new actors. However, strategies may also 
be aimed at changing the access rules for actors or at influencing the network 
as a whole by promoting network formation, and self-regulation, or 
modifications to the system; 
- Strategies aimed at the network outcomes; these are strategies, which try to 
influence the standards or the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable way 
so that games within networks evolve in a different way because other 
strategic choices are made. The point of intervention here is thus not the actors 
as in the previous set of strategies but their choices. This means the sustainable 
influencing of actors’ strategic choices and the outcomes resulting from them. 
The most important institutional design strategies in this category are 
strategies to change the pay-off structure, to change professional codes and 
morals and strategies, which are aimed at changing evaluation criteria; 
- Strategies aimed at network interactions; these are strategies, which try to 
influence the interactions between actors in a sustainable way. These strategies 
are thus aimed at influencing rules, which regulate the process in networks and 
in this way try to facilitate interactions, to put them in a framework or to make 
linkages. Strategies in this category include developing conflict settlement 
mechanisms or introducing certain procedures into interactions. But strategies 
such as certification or influencing supervisory relationships also fall into this 
category. 
 
These strategies are directly aimed at changing rules either by direct intervention upon 
the rules or by affecting perceptions of actors and their strategies. In this paper we 
focus on the institutional design interventions of the EU on the one hand and the 
effects, that is the changes in rules on the other hand.  
 
Types of rules 
To study the institutional structure of a network and changes in that structure, we need 
to analyze and describe the types of rules and their content. Various examples are 
available in the literature (see, e.g., Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1986; Burns and 
Flam, 1987; Klijn, 1996; Scharpf, 1997). For the purpose of this paper, i.e. studying 
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the changes in the Dutch fishery network as result of interventions of the European 
Union and, given the complexity of this (the changes in the fisheries network in the 
past ten years), we limit the analysis to three categories of rules (see also Klijn, 2001): 
 Domain rules: these determine the division of tasks in the institutional 
system. Laws and regulations determine the tasks of the Product 
Corporation (see later on for a clarification). The same holds for the tasks 
of governments. Statutes of private organisations also define objectives and 
tasks. Informal domain agreements may also have the status of rule. The 
position of actors is determined as much by implicit and shared rules about 
mutual positions in the institutional system as by the formal division of 
tasks. 
 Interaction rules: these, among other things, determine what information is 
exchanged and how this is done, the consultation patterns between actors, 
and how collective decisions are made. 
 Evaluation rules: these are rules upon which actors evaluate the outcomes 
of their actions, the procedures to be followed, and the products that are 
realised. In this specific network, they especially concern what is 
considered good fisheries policy and how it is made. 
 
These rules structure the network. Institutional design is aimed at changing these 
rules. We can specify institutional design strategies in the light of the different types 
of rules: 
- Domain rules are the main rules affected by design strategies focused 
upon network composition; 
- Interaction rules are mainly affected by design strategies focused upon 
network interactions; 
- Institutional design focused upon network outcomes is of course 
intended to change the evaluation rules. 
 
Institutional design: a complex process 
Such changes are however far from clear and institutional design is far from a simple 
top down strategy as is already clear from our elaboration on how network rules 
change. There are several reasons why institutional design is a far messier job that the 
word suggest and than many politicians are think: 
- Power; measures of institutional design often conflict with the interests and 
positions of actors in networks. This is logically if one reminds that changing 
rules is also always (not solely!) a question of power. Existing rules reflect the 
practices and positions of the past where they have been formed. Changing 
that rules always affect power positions; 
- Interpretation; each intervention of institutional design will be interpreted by 
the actors in the network and will be changed and reworked by the actors of 
the network jointly; 
- Complexity; institutional design, even if it is imposed by one actor, will be 
implemented in a complex interaction process between actors in which the 
content can change and unexpected outcomes may result. An attempt to 
institutional design will be part of a large and complicated set of developments 
in which such an attempt easily gets another direction. 
 
So effects of institutional interventions and initiatives are never clear at the beginning 
but are achieved in a complex process. That makes it interesting to study interventions 
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and their effects, which is what is being done in this paper. We can expect that 
institutional changes which fit in an ongoing development in the network (go with the 
flow), will be more effective than interventions which go in opposite directions than 
developments within the network (against the flow). In this paper we not only try to 
analyse institutional changes as result of interventions with a institutional design 
character but also look at how these interventions are ‘processed’, fortified or 
weakened, in the everyday dynamics of a network.   
 
The Research Method 
A difficulty in the reconstruction of rules is that they do not exist ‘out there’ but are 
rather shaped by actors and are, as a result, a social construction. So by necessity, a 
reconstruction of rules is the reinterpretation by the researcher (see Klijn, 1996 and 
Scharpf, 1997). The reconstruction of formal rules is, obviously, much easier. 
For this article the rules have been reconstructed through interviews with 28 actors in 
the fisheries network such as associates of the Product Corporation (see section 3), 
civil servants of the ministry, and representatives of fisheries organisations (Van 
Buuren, 2002). In these interviews, we encouraged interviewees to explicate all sorts 
of formal and informal agreements about division of tasks, types of interaction and 
methods of evaluation. Especially important was the question of why they regarded 
certain actions as self-evident and disapproved of other actions. Thus, implicit 
assumptions about ‘legitimate behaviour’ were uncovered. By way of controlling, we 
asked whether the interviewees could identify with and recognise the reconstructed 
rules. In addition, a large number of policy documents was studied. From these we 
deduced the impact of European policy interventions on the institutional arrangements 
in the fisheries network. Finally, a brief survey was sent to all members of the co-
management groups (67 people). Of these, 36 responded (53.7%). The questions 
mainly concerned the functioning of these quasi-autonomous groups of fishermen (see 
section 3) and the relations of the fisheries organisation with the PC (Van Buuren, 
2002). 
 
 
3. Europe and the Dutch Fisheries sector  
 
In this article, we address the impact of European interventions in the past ten years in 
the Dutch fisheries network in terms of institutional changes. After all, with its active 
fisheries policy, the EU has had – directly and indirectly – substantial influence upon 
the positions and relations within national fisheries networks. To focus our analysis, 
we look especially at the changing position of the Product Corporation as a 
consequence of this European involvement. 
 
Characteristics of the Dutch fisheries network 
There are few Dutch policy sectors that have been under such pressure in recent years 
as the fisheries sector. At the beginning of the 1980s, the fisheries network could be 
characterised as a ‘fisheries policy community’. The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries operated as a clientele department and developed policy in 
the interest of the fisheries. Consultation with the sector was institutionalised a public 
corporation: the Fish Product Corporation.  
The Fish Product Corporation is characteristically Dutch. It was created in the 1950s 
together with other product corporations (PCs) with the enactment of the Corporate 
Association Act. The essence of this act was the creation of organisations that would 
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be involved in policy making on behalf of a specific policy sector. The management 
of these organisations consisted of representatives from sector organisations and 
observers from relevant ministries and the Social-Economic Council (an advisory 
body for the cabinet on social-economic policy). The corporation’s task is to support 
the sector with issues of promotion, research, and administration. They also have to 
support government in the implementation of policy and regulation and are involved 
in policy making. They provide a platform for the sector’s discussions with 
government about policy plans. The corporation also has regulative authority and can 
impose binding regulations upon companies. The PC thus provides a link between the 
sector (mainly the fishery organisations) and the government. 
Personified by their chairpersons, the fisheries organisations, namely the Dutch 
Fishery Association and the Federation of Fisheries Associations, had strong 
advocates with substantial public exposure (Van der Kroon, 1994). Together they 
sought out the best for the sector. 
 
The EU and the Dutch fisheries network in the eighties  
This image of a corporatist policy sector was severely challenged in the 1980s. In 
1977, European quota regulations were established, and suddenly, fishermen were 
required to decrease their catches. The transfer of fishing to control proceeded with 
difficulty, and regulation was massively evaded. Following a European evaluation in 
1983, a parliamentary inquiry committee was established. This committee concluded 
that civil servants and political officeholders had worked too closely with the interests 
of fishermen and their industry. The fisheries interest was too quickly viewed as 
synonymous with national interest (Hoetjes, 1993). 
Strict measures politicised the relations. Real physical battles occurred between 
fishermen and the police (Kickert, 2002). In 1989, the Minister of Agriculture was 
forced to resign because regulations were still not sufficiently followed. His successor 
hoped to solve these problems. Upon his initiative, and together with the Fish Product 
Corporation and the fisheries industry, an effort was made to establish a system of co-
management to strengthen the control of the fishing quota, the Biesheuvel system. 
Fishermen received responsibility for quota control. They formed groups in which the 
quota were distributed and controlled. In first instance, oversight and sanctioning was 
the responsibility of the management group itself. Trust was slowly re-established and 
quota control became increasingly de-politicised. The fisheries sector remains an 
independent, licentious sector. 
With the specific national implementation strategies for the quota regulations, the 
institutional impact of the EU interventions in the Dutch network remain limited. The 
main effect was the diminishing position of the Dutch ministry of Agriculture. But the 
internal relationships did not change spectacularly.  
We start our institutional analyse at roughly this stage thus the beginning of the 90ies. 
We analyse the institutional changes by comparing the set of institutional rules that 
‘governed’ the fisheries network in 1990 (see section 4), the dynamics in the fisheries 
network between 1990 and 2000 (section 5) and the changed set of rules in 2000 
(section 6). We view the fisheries network in a relatively limited sense. The central 
actors are the Fisheries Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Fish Product 
Corporation, the overarching organisations in fisheries (the sector organisations) and 
(since the 1980s) the European Union (i.e., its Directorate General for Fisheries). 
Recently, nature and environmental interest groups want to join the network, 
supported by the ‘green policies’ of the EU. 
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4. Network Rules around 1990 
 
In the 1980s, the fisheries network was relatively closed. The first EU interventions 
broke open this somewhat corporatist institutional structure of the sector a little bit. 
But it is only in the 90ties that EU interventions actually effect the autonomy of the 
Dutch fisheries network. And they also resulted in an environment in which it was 
increasingly difficult to solve conflict and distribution problems exclusively within 
the network. For proper understanding of the changes that occurred, we first provide 
an overview of the rules around 1990, i.e. after the first quota measures were 
implemented through the Biesheuvel system. 
 
Domain Rules: Live and Let Live 
The most important domain rules in the early 1990s expressed a ‘live and let live’ 
attitude in the fisheries. Everyone knew his place in the corporatist network, and 
national regulations were made in consultation. The PC’s role as platform placed it in 
an advantageous position in policy advising. Its standpoints were developed in 
intensive consultation with the sector. 
Despite this, the PC was not exactly appreciated in the fisheries sector. Fishermen 
were averse to any type of governmental interference. They could not get around the 
PC or influence it, but they could organise themselves. In their perception it was a 
costly institution. The ‘live and let live’ doctrine culminated in the rule: what can be 
done privately, must be done privately. Initially the EU held back, with the exception 
of the quota regulation and the market organisation. The Ministry of Agriculture held 
the political primacy, but used it cautiously because it valued support for her policies 
(see also Bekke et al., 1994). 
 
Table 1. Domain rules in fisheries network 
 Domain rules: 
1 Within policy discretion defined by national governments, the EU sets frameworks for national 
fishery policies. This is especially with regard to market organisation, capacity reduction and 
catch regulation. 
2 The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for national fishery policy within the framework set by 
the EU. 
3 The PC represents the interests of the sector and, taking into account the general interest, supports 
the sector where the sector believes it necessary and cooperates in the implementation of 
government policy. 
4 The sector organisations take care of the interests of their members, the fishermen. 
6 The fisherman is king on his ship in does not want to be under unnecessarily tutelage. It is 
necessary to convince him of the use of intended measures. 
7 The Fisheries Directorate takes care of the fisheries interests within national government. 
8 Within the frameworks set by government the PC has an autonomous regulative authority. The 
board determines the more detailed content of policy. Government oversight is marginal. 
9 The PC advises government about policy and regulation. 
10 Branch organisations have a decisive voice with regard to the activities of the PC (veto power). 
11 The PC prepares the common sector standpoints and represents these. 
12 Branch organisations have the right to independently formulate their own standpoint. 
13 National government determines the degree to which it wants to be responsible for the content 
and implementation of its policy. 
14 What can be done privately, must be done privately: only when the private associations cannot 
perform a task does it become a responsibility of the PC. 
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Interaction Rules: Corporatism in Optima Forma 
The interaction rules ‘regulated’ the relations between actors in the fisheries network. 
The PC offered a consultation platform for the sector (the Committee for International 
Affairs for issues concerning the market organisation and the Cutter Committee for 
cutter-rigged boats). The PC also provided a platform for consultation between 
minister and sector in the “Regular Supply Consultation’. The relation between the 
ministry and the PC took the shape of the latter having the right to advise with regard 
to intended policy and oversight of the ministry on regulations by the PC. 
 
Table 2. Interaction rules in the fisheries network 
 Interaction rules: 
1 In PC’s International Affairs Committee, market organisation is discussed.  PO’s are represented 
there. Together they determine the standpoint with regard to Europe. In the PC’s Cutter 
Committee, the sector determines its standpoints on Cutter issues. 
2 The Supply Issues Committee addresses all issues concerning supply. 
3 In the regular supply meeting with the minister, the sector discusses the entire state of affairs with 
the government. 
4 Agreement with ordinances from the ministry involved is sufficient for an ordinance to be passed.
5 The PC can advise about intended policy. 
 
Evaluation Rules: Fisheries Interests are General Interests 
The relevant evaluation rules (with which those involved evaluate the results of policy 
type interactions in the fisheries network) assume strongly that fisheries policy and 
fisheries interests are synonymous. Furthermore, actors regard it as self-evident that 
results of policy processes are only good when accepted by the sector.  
 
Table 3. Evaluation rules in the fisheries network 
 Evaluation rules: 
1 Policy is for and by the fisheries. Fisheries policy serves the fisheries interest. 
2 Policy is legitimate when fisheries sector and politics agree. 
3 Support for intended policy in the sector must be pursued as much as possible. To that end there is 
regular and ad hoc consultation with the sector. 
 
These rules remained almost implicit until their validity became the subject of 
discussion. This was especially the case with the ‘support rule’. Tinkering with this 
rule determined the problems in the 1980s (quota management) and the solution 
direction in the 1990s (co-management). One respondent remarked: “In the end, the 
government has the authority to push issues through but to large extent, it will 
consider what support it has.” In general, this rule remains in the fisheries network 
(Dorren, 1996). 
The problems in the 1980s were mainly a consequence of the fishermen’s perceptions 
about the lack of legitimacy of European regulations. Also, policy did not serve the 
short-term interest of the fisherman. One of their leaders said succinctly: “If it is not 
between the ears of the fishermen, you need one-on-one supervisors. Otherwise it is 
simply not going to work.” 
 
Toward the late 1980s and early 1990s, the fisheries network had all of the 
characteristics of a rather closed corporatist network in which issues were settled 
internally and among those interested. However, the interventions of the EU result in 
a major institutional redesign of these rules. 
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5. EU interventions and developments in the Dutch fisheries network 
 
From the early nineties, the position of the European Union in the national fishery 
policies became stronger and stronger. On four items, the network was put under 
pressure and changed considerably. We summarise these four interventions and their 
context in table 4. 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of the EU institutional design interventions 
Institutional 
design 
intervention 
Type of intervention  Main rules affected 
(see section 4 and 6) 
Comments  
1. Fish quota 
and 
downsizing 
catch of fish 
 
 
Mainly aimed at network 
outcomes and a little bit 
on network composition 
Changing evaluation 
rules (what is profitable 
and good in the 
network). Indirect: 
emphasising the domain 
rule of the EU  
Unilaterally top down measures to 
limited fish catch. Bypassing the 
ministry of Agriculture 
2. Stimulating 
green issues 
in fisheries 
Mainly aimed at network 
composition (stimulating 
access of other groups) 
Introducing new actors 
weakens existing 
domain rules of PC, 
sector and ministry.  
Encouragement to take ecological 
issues into account in fishery policy 
and politics 
3. Stimulating 
private 
organisations 
and Producer 
Organisations 
Aimed at network 
composition 
(strengthening actors and 
changing relations 
between actors in 
network) 
Changing  domain 
rules: strengthened for 
private organisations, 
weakened for PC 
By stimulating the private 
organisations the EU explicitly 
ignores the Product Corporation 
4. Free market 
policy 
Mainly at network 
interactions and indirectly 
on network composition 
Weakened domain and 
interaction rules that 
were in favour of PC. 
Strengthened domain 
rule of private 
organisations.  
This is a general policy of the EU not 
specifically target at the fishery 
network. It does however include 
ignoring and bypassing the traditional 
Dutch organisation of the Product 
Corporation. This forms an extra 
impetus for the national debate about 
the PC-structure 
 
 
1. The EU and quota regulations 
European quota regulation, partially a result of alarming data about the deteriorating 
numbers of fish, was strengthened substantially in the 1990s. Also, the EU developed 
an extensive package of auxiliary policy, such as, e.g., technical measures (about the 
allowed width of meshes) and sea-day regulations (the number of days that fishermen 
can fish at sea), in order to reduce the amount of fishing. Its ‘top-down’ manner of 
administration – with little attention for national administrative culture – is not 
appreciated. “The Commission is just muddling along.” An associate of the PC 
remarks: “they (the fishermen) are heard, but no one listens.”  
The EU passed the national government and doesn’t reckon with the Dutch 
consensual approach. Its top-down approach and the power to enforce compliance 
(because of the rather docile attitude of the national government, after the trauma of 
the eighties), give the EU a powerful position within the Dutch network.  
 
2. New Issues in the Fisheries Network: Nature and the Environment 
An important development in European fisheries policy, and thus in national policy, is 
the increased attention for the issue of ‘nature and environment’. In the annual reports 
of the PC, a steady increase for the number of national policy initiatives in this area 
are evident (Van Buuren, 2002). European attention for the ecological values in 
fisheries policy forces the department to pay also structural attention to this. Accent 
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nature areas are introduced, as well as ecological indicators, ecosystem targets, an 
action plan biodiversity and the precautionary principle.  
It is not so much the ‘greenification’ of fisheries policy that puts pressure on mutual 
relations, but more the manner in which it is implemented. The sector perceives the 
stream of initiatives, such as the policy memo “Sea and Coastal Fisheries” (see LNV, 
1993a and 1993b), the establishment of ecosystem objectives and the policy brief on 
the welfare of fish, as administrative overdoses. One respondent remarked: “The 
sector is confronted with too many initiatives [...]. Hence, such a sector is confronted 
with ecosystem objectives (initiative of the Ministry of Public Housing, Planning and 
Environment, AvB and EHK) and the next day with the fifth memo on planning 
(initiative of the Ministry of Housing, AvB and EHK) that also contains all sorts of 
planning regarding the North Sea. And then someone appears who says: I also have 
Ecological Quality Objectives (policy plan of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, AvB 
and EHK). They do not know what to do with it.”  
 
3. Changing Relations in the Network: Professionalization of the Sector 
Since private parties were also involved, the PC faced challenges from the private 
sector as well. In the 1990s, fisheries organisations experienced high 
professionalization. To a large extent, this was a consequence of European policy 
regarding Producers organisations. The EU, in the Common Market Policy gave these 
voluntary associations of fishermen various market organising authorities. Thus, some 
tasks of the PC became superfluous and were thus abolished. Professionalization also 
occurred in the Biesheuvel groups. Together with the Producers organisations, they 
were able to implement the quota regulation and the market organisation. The sector 
itself initiated consultation among Producers organisations so that other committees, 
led by the PC, ceased to exist or lost their functions. As a result, the PC lost part of its 
influence upon cutter-rigged issues. Also, because of these developments, the PC 
could no longer effectively co-ordinate the Biesheuvel system. The group meetings, 
chaired by the PC, were convened more infrequently. The fisheries organisations 
themselves acquired the means to expand their secretarial function so that their 
representatives (some individuals who have leading positions) had more time to build 
and expand the fisheries lobby.  
The results of our survey supported these conclusions. The respondents are not 
satisfied about the way the PC defend their interests. The Producer Organisation is 
seen is becoming more and more important. In their concrete actions, we see an 
increased use of ‘own’ organisations and a neglecting of the Fish PC.  
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Figure 1. Opinions of the sector about the Fish PC and the Producers Organisations 
(n=36) 
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Many in the fisheries world regarded the Producer Organisation as the organisation of 
the future, and they wanted to invest in these, at the cost of the PC. The joint meetings 
of the Producer Organisations gained in importance. 
The PC, on the other hand, increasingly profiled itself as a vanguard institute that 
desired to fulfil a meaningful role for the sector and the ministry. It sought to facilitate 
the transformation to a more durable fisheries sector. To that end, it developed various 
initiatives, but the scepticism in the sector greatly inhibited this. 
The PC attempted to streamline negotiations between sector and government and to 
integrate it through its own channels. But this was not always successful since it met 
with resistance from the sector and with pragmatism in the ministry. In the 
development of the Biesheuvel system, we can certainly recognise that the PC was 
marginalised and forced to give up its role almost entirely. 
 
4. The Fish Product Corporation in a Free Market 
The battle faced by the fisheries sector was intensified by the political discussion 
about the public corporation system in the 1990s. An important argument in favour of 
revising the system was the relation of the PCs to European regulations. The concern 
was that the Dutch product corporations were not tailored to European policy with 
regard to the free market objectives and market organisation through private product 
organisations. A public organisation had no place there. As a result, a number of 
competencies were removed from the PCs.  
The PC doesn’t fit within the European doctrine about the role of government in 
relation to the free market. It is an intermingling of public and private elements and an 
not-allowed association of private businesses. In their policy the EU obviously neglect 
the PCs. The former chairman of the Fish PC participates in European policy 
processes as the representative of the united private fisheries organisation. Otherwise, 
he was not allowed to participate!   
This change was part of a much larger (national) debate about the manner in which 
the relations between the government and the private sector were shaped. In part as a 
consequence of this argument, the PC system came under pressure during the so-
called Purple cabinets (1994-2002; in which socialist, liberal and democratic parties 
govern together). Consequently, the Fish PC had to prove itself time and again 
(Dijkstra, 2000). The sector had already criticised how the PC Fisheries exercised its 
duties (see below), and this critique became more vehement as a result of this 
development. Because of the PC discussion and the resulting limitations on its 
functioning, the PC gradually lost its added value for the fisheries. For example, the 
obligation of the ministry to request advice about intended policy from the PC was 
abolished and oversight on the regulative competency of the PC was strengthened. 
The informal patterns of mutual contacts and information exchange between the 
Fisheries Directorate and the PC continued to exist, but the discretion of the latter was 
decreased.  
 
Conclusion: A Network under Pressure 
An important consequence of European involvement in Dutch fisheries was that the 
network was put under pressure in the 1990s. Partly by connecting to existing 
developments (the discussion about the position of the Fish Corporation and the 
professionalization of the sector), but also partly by self-imposed developments 
(quota regulation, greenification), the EU interventions effects heavily the 
institutional relations in the network. We will explore the consequences in the next 
paragraph. 
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6. Changing Rules in the Fisheries Network 
 
As indicated in section 5, the EU stimulated a change trajectory in the Dutch fisheries 
network. The network was broken open effectively and the room to deal with issues 
internally in a discrete manner diminished. Some interventions were further enhanced 
by network internal developments (professionalisation of the sector, discussion about 
the PC). The classic corporatist rules in the network were hollowed out, as a result of 
all these developments. The consequences of the (direct and indirect) interventions of 
the EU in the institutional structure of the fisheries network, that is the basic rules of 
the network, are analysed in this section. 
 
Changes in Domain Rules 
The various developments in the fisheries network had great consequences for the 
domains of the various actors in the network. The EU was able to unilaterally expand 
its domain. The ministry, as a consequence, lost much of its policy discretion. The 
sector and the PC complained, but were unable to turn the tide. While the ‘purple 
polarisation’ and the ‘greenification’ basically amounted to an interventionist strategy 
on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture, the EU ultimately forced them. As a 
consequence of the PC debate, the PC lost influence: “When I came there [some 
twenty years ago, AvB/EHK], the Industrial and the Product Corporation were 
‘gentlemen’ of great authority. They had real influence because of their formal 
authority. This was a public corporate organisation. They determined what happened. 
But all that is gone.” 
The strong involvement of Brussels forced the Fisheries Directorate to transform itself 
from a sector directorate to a more neutral policy directorate. As a result, relations 
with the sector became less intimate, and the sector was forced to learn to deal with its 
own problems, such as fisheries issues addressed by other ministries (e.g., social-
economic issues). 
The rule ‘What can be done privately, must be done privately’ was upheld, and 
obviously especially by the private parties. They managed to enhance their domain 
with the help of the EU and were no longer as dependent upon the PC: “Hence we can 
also get finances through the avenue of private Producers Organisations in order to 
professionalise the organisation. Thus the argument of the PC [that they are the only 
one who have the means to make joint action possible, AvB/EHK] is no longer as 
strong.” The most important changes in the domain rules are provided in table 5. 
 
 14
Table 5. Changing domain rules  
 Domain rules:  
1 Within the room for policy discretion defined by national government, the EU 
determines national fisheries policy 
Emphasised  
2 The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for national fisheries policy within the 
framework set by the EU 
Unchanged 
3 The PC represents the interests of the sector, taking general interest into account, 
supports the sector where it considers it necessary and cooperates in the 
implementation of government policy 
Unchanged, 
but contested 
4 The sector organisations look after the interests of their members, the fishermen More strictly 
enforced  
6 The Producer organisations operate in a market organising manner and  ‘manage’ 
the catch regulation together with the group 
New 
7 The fisherman is king on his ship and does not wish to be under patronised when 
unnecessary. It is necessary to convince him of the use of intended measures 
Unchanged 
8 What can be done privately, must be done privately. Only when a task cannot be 
performed by private actors can it be the responsibility of the PC 
More strictly 
enforced 
9 Branch organisations have a decisive voice in the activities of the PC (veto 
power). 
Unchanged 
10 The PC prepares common sector standpoints and represents these Unchanged 
11 Branch organisations have the right to take independently their own standpoint Unchanged 
12 Within the boundaries set by national government the PC has autonomous 
regulative authority 
More limited  
13 Public primacy: national government determines to what degree it will take 
responsibility for the content and implementation of its policy 
Emphasised 
14 The Fisheries Directorate focuses on general policy; the sector looks after the 
fisheries interest in the Ministry and elsewhere 
Changed 
 
Changes in Interaction Rules 
The political debate about the organisation of the representation of the private 
interests by the PC’s changed the relations between ministry and PC, especially 
because the obligation of advising was abolished. Requesting advice became 
voluntary: “Presently it is nothing more than a neighbourly service. It is much more 
like “Let us not start on the wrong foot with this regulation, Let’s ask advice”. But I 
must say, this is not the standard.” according to a civil servant from the Agriculture 
Ministry. 
The professionalization of the sector resulted in preference being given to interactions 
internal to the sector over interactions through the PC. The sector considered the 
Producers Organisation consultation sufficient for regulating its affairs (concerning 
fishing quotas and market regulation) in the direction of ‘Brussels’. The PC became 
increasingly marginalized as a platform for the sector. 
 
Table 6. Changing interaction rules 
 Interaction rules:  
1 When considered necessary, the Ministry will request advice from the PC Changed 
2 In the producers’ meetings the sector regulates as far as it can matters concerning 
cutters 
New 
3 All matters concerning supply are addressed in the Supply Matters Committee Weakened 
4 In the frequent supply meetings with the minister the sector discusses the general 
way of doing things with government 
Unchanged 
5 Agreement with the Social-Economic Council, the European Commission and the 
ministry involved is necessary before a regulation is enacted 
Changed  
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Changes in Evaluation Rules 
The self-evidence of the notion that the fisheries interest must be served by fisheries 
policy clearly diminished, as a result of EU interventions and the discussions about 
the environment. The standard of good fisheries policy clearly shifted although there 
was no unanimous agreement about its direction. In this sense, a development can be 
seen from a more or less uniformly shared understanding about the standard of good 
fisheries policy to a different somewhat ambiguous standard that was, at least, 
broader. The support rule was still relevant, certainly in the eyes of the sector, but not 
at any price. In sum: the EU adds some important evaluation criteria to the national 
policy discourse. Table 7 provides an overview of the changes in these evaluation 
rules. 
 
Table 7. Changing evaluation rules  
 Evaluation rules:  
1 Fisheries policy serves both the nature and the fisheries interests. Attempts are 
made to reconcile fisheries interests with ecological values. A sustainable, 
ecologically responsible fisheries is the objective 
Changed 
2 Policy is legitimate when sector, politics, and society (nature interests) all agree Changed 
3 Support in the sector for policy intentions must be pursued as much as possible. In 
order to get this there is regular and ad hoc consultation with the sector 
Unchanged, 
ambiguous 
 
 
Conclusion 
In general, we see how the fishery network is broken open by the interventions of the 
EU. The position of the Product Corporation is severely challenged by a 
professionalized sector and the much broader task orientation of the ministry. The 
interventions of the EU have dramatically changed positions and interaction rules. In 
the last paragraph we analyse the specific dynamics of institutional design and take 
some general conclusions.  
 
 
7. The impact of institutional design 
 
From a comparison of the two sets of rules, the effects of the intervention of the 
European Union become clear. Many domain-, interaction- and evaluation rules 
change during the period 1990 – 2002. However, the patterns in which the 
institutional changes occur, are not always the same. Some rules changed very clearly, 
other became ambiguous. There are a lot of complications when the EU tries to 
restructure the Dutch fisheries network. 
  
Patterns of change 
Sometimes it goes easy: the professionalisation of the private organisations is an 
example of a rather successful intervention, which supported developments already 
underway in the network. But the discussion about the quota raised heavy protest 
from the Dutch fishery network. Only through a long process of pushing and pulling 
(one has to take into account that the first intervention date from the early eighties) 
the EU succeed in get the position it need to effectively implement its policy 
ambitions. And its position is still not undisputed. Thus if we look at the experiences 
in Dutch fisheries network we can see an important distinction in the dynamics of 
institutional design. When an institutional intervention hooks on a present 
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development within the network, acceleration can be realised. When an intervention 
opposes such a development, much more energy is needed to realise a restructuring of 
the network.  
The second observation would be that the outcomes of a process of institutional 
design couldn’t be known in advance. Actors react strategically on these attempts, try 
to make an interpretation of the intervention and thereby shape and change 
interventions of institutional design. So evaluation of strategies of institutional design 
requires a careful look at the developments and changes in rules in networks and the 
strategic patterns that are the result of institutional design interventions. One also 
needs a picture of the trajectory in which changes take place. In this paper this is 
attempted by studying the changes in rules over time. This should maybe be extended 
by a more dynamic and long range view of the actors’ strategies and the patterns than 
we did here. 
Some of the institutional design strategies are not always an intended policy strategy. 
A key objective of the EU is realising a free internal market. Product Corporations 
don’t fit in this image. But the EU leaves alone the PCs. They were neglected. But 
when a discussion in Dutch politics raises, the arguments of Europeanisation and a 
free market were used in order to diminish the position of the EU. So, European 
arguments were used in order to realise national policy ambitions. In table 8 we 
summarize the differences in types of institutional design attempts and their 
effectiveness. 
 
Table 8. Effects of EU institutional interventions 
EU intervention Against or with the ‘flow’ 
of the network 
Institutional effects Effective? 
Fish quota and 
downsizing catch 
of fish 
Against the flow Over a long period (1970-2003) 
the closed fisheries network is 
opened and classical positions 
are changed 
Yes, but only after a long 
period of pushing and 
pulling. And effects 
remain uncertain  
Stimulating green 
issues in fisheries 
More or less with the flow 
(stimulates also network 
internal development) 
In a decade ‘green evaluation 
criteria’ become the only valid 
standards for evaluating 
fisheries policy.  
The joint effort of the EU 
and nature organisations 
leads to the opening of a 
closed ministry – sector 
network 
Stimulating 
private 
organisations in 
fishery network 
With the flow Important: the private 
organisations become powerful 
players in the network, while 
the position of the PC 
marginalizes.  
Yes, the PC has a serious 
problem in finding new 
tasks with added value for 
the sector 
Free market policy Neither of both, pragmatic 
used to legitimate network 
internal development  
New actors (PO’s), diminished 
position for PC and ministry of 
Agriculture 
Yes, a strong EU 
interventional policy 
results in large changes 
 
 
Some final reflections: possibilities for institutional design and research 
The interventions of institutional design tend to work out within the existing sets of 
rules of networks and don’t lead to an entire new set of rules, which is of course not 
surprisingly. Institutions are relative durable. This does set some limitations and 
narrows the possibilities of institutional design measures. Especially politicians do not 
always seem to realise this point themselves sufficiently. On the other hand: path 
dependencies are strong but they also make that changes once they are ‘implemented’ 
can not be undone in an instrumental way. The past set of rules simply does not exist 
anymore. It is thus very unlikely that the changed relationship between fishery 
organisations and Product Corporation will be restored in the old situation. 
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If we look at the used design strategies of the EU (see also section 5) it is clear that 
different types of strategies (aimed at composition, interactions or outcomes, see 
section2) are used at the same time in interventions. This points at the fact that the 
types of strategies maybe are more an analytical tool to describe and analyse the 
content of strategies, than a tool to analyse effective and non-effective strategies. The 
fact that effect is dependent on both the existing set of rules in a network and the 
strategic choices and interpretations of actors in networks make general statements 
about effects of institutional design very difficult. But maybe ongoing research on this 
topic can reveal certain successful mix of strategies. 
Because of the various effects of institutional design its long-term character and the 
fact that interventions are being interpreted by involved actors the effects of 
institutional design can, as said before, only be examined by ‘close reading’. If one 
wants to analyse effects of institutional design interventions a close look at the 
developments within networks is essential to get a realistic picture. The research 
should be addressed at specifying types of strategies, analysing reactions of actors on 
these strategies and on looking at different trajectories of change. This could maybe 
result in a more realistic view on institutional design than sometimes is held in 
political spheres. 
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